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ARTICLE
DESIGNING SYSTEMS FOR ACHIEVING





In the seventeen years since the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (the
“Agreement”) was signed, much has happened in Northern Ireland that
would not have seemed possible in the years of violence leading up to the
Agreement. Adversaries are governing together—a former IRA commander
shared power in the Northern Ireland Assembly with the leader of the Ulster
Democratic Unionist Party who once wrote that the Agreement was “a rep-
rehensible deal[,] . . . an insult to the victims of terrorism and . . . a two-
fingered salute to the democratic community of Northern Ireland.”1
Paramilitaries on both sides of the divide surrendered their guns, prisoners
were released, and policing practices improved. It now looks as if peace is
moving forward. But in reality, there is a paradoxical state of affairs. On the
one hand, Northern Ireland is advancing towards a peaceful regime after
three decades of violence and seemingly intractable conflict.2 On the other,
there is considerable fragility in civil society where “conflict is still very
present on the ground,”3 walls still separate sectarian communities,4
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, Director of ADR & Conflict Res-
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1. Ian R. K. Paisley, Peace Agreement—Or Last Piece in a Sellout Agreement, 22 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1273, 1319 (1999).
2. A visible sign of this transformation was the decision to host the G8 summit in Northern
Ireland in 2013.
3. Ariel Heifetz Knobel, A Paradoxical Peace in Northern Ireland, 26 PRAXIS: THE
FLETCHER J. OF HUM. SECURITY 89 (2011); see also Joshua Keating, After Decades of Peace, the
Situation in Northern Ireland is Looking Extremely Fragile, SLATE (Sept. 29, 2015, 4:00 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/09/29/after_decades_of_peace_the_situation_in_
northern_ireland_is_looking_extremely.html.
4. Ari Shapiro, For Northern Ireland, Wounds from ‘The Troubles’ Are Still Raw, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Nov. 28, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/11/28/3671830
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paramilitaries still intimidate people,5 and parades can precipitate serious
rioting.6 In the view of one former political leader, the Agreement’s “spirit
of generosity [has] evaporated: ‘Everyone is back in their silos.’”7
During this post-conflict era, there are multiple contested issues in
Northern Ireland that are rooted in the fundamental question of how to re-
member the legacy of the past,8 a past which continues to have a destabi-
lizing effect on the present.9 The challenges are daunting in the face of
apparent political paralysis and lack of trust between unionist and national-
ist leaders. How can we recover truth and make peace with the past? How
can we determine whose narratives count when it comes to recovering
truth? How can we determine the identity of victims and how to care for
them?10 How can we address the aftermath of conflict and trauma-related
illness?
Contentious issues manifest themselves in disputes related to flags and
parades, policing, truth recovery, human rights, and the needs of victims.
There has been much debate but not much progress about the way forward
in recovering truth.11 In this regard, there is a tension, not unfamiliar in
transitional countries, between the goals of justice and reconciliation.12 For
many victims, there is an urgent need for justice, and justice means truth.13
05/for-northern-ireland-wounds-from-the-troubles-are-still-raw. In Belfast these walls encourage
tourism but they are still there. See id.
5. Steven McCaffrey, North Paramilitaries Forcing Hundreds from Homes Every Year,
IRISH TIMES (June 25, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/north-
paramilitaries-forcing-hundreds-from-homes-every-year-1.2261985.
6. See Michael Hamilton & Dominic Bryan, Deepening Democracy? Dispute System De-
sign and the Mediation of Contested Parades in Northern Ireland, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
133, 147–53 (2006). Many Catholics view Protestant parades as triumphalistic. Mohammed Aly
Sergie, The Northern Ireland Peace Process, COUNC. ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 3, 2014), http://
www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/northern-ireland-peace-process/p31552.
7. Allan Leonard, National Reconciliation: “Patriotism is not enough”, N. IR. FOUND. (Feb.
19, 2015), http://northernireland.foundation/2015/02/20/national-reconciliation-patriotism-is-not-
enough; see also Eamonn McCann, The Troubles Are Back, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/10/05/opinion/the-troubles-are-back.html.
8. See Baroness Nuala O’Loan, Dealing with the Past, Address at Queen’s University Bel-
fast (May 28, 2015), http://www.qub.ac.uk/research-centres/isctsj/filestore/Filetoupload,507149,
en.pdf; President Michael Higgins, ‘1916 and the Ethics of Memory’ Address at the Glencree
Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (June 27, 2015), http://www.president.ie/en/media-library/
speeches/1916-and-the-ethics-of-memory.
9. KIERAN MCEVOY, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PAST: OPTIONS FOR TRUTH RECOVERY RE-
GARDING CONFLICT IN AND ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND, vii (2006).
10. HAASS-O’SULLIVAN NEGOTIATIONS PROPOSAL, infra note 52.
11. Steven McCaffery, Should truth be separated from reconciliation?, THE DETAIL (May
20, 2013), http://www.thedetail.tv/articles/should-truth-be-separated-from-reconciliation.
12. Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 761, 766 (2003); RUTI G. TEITAL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); Susan Opotow, Psychol-
ogy of Impunity and Injustice: Implications for Social Reconciliation, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE
201 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
13. Patricia Lundy & Bill Rolston, Redress for Past Harms? Official Apologies in Northern
Ireland, 20 INT’L J. HUM. RIGHTS 104, 117 (2015) (“[F]or many victims of state violence, justice
often equates with ‘truth.’”).
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Witnesses have died, memories have faded with the passage of time, and
victims believe that it is critical to obtain information from aging perpetra-
tors.14 Many families of victims in Northern Ireland strongly support an
international, independent truth commission.15 Yet some political parties
voice strong opposition to any truth recovery process.16 Still, others ques-
tion whether truth and reconciliation should function as a binary process or
whether truth should be separated from reconciliation.17 In short, there is
not a strong base of support for a truth recovery process.18
Several scholars have examined Northern Ireland’s legal and political
post-conflict developments through the lens of transitional justice,19 a term
that refers to the ways in which countries emerging from violent conflict
deal with past human rights abuses20 and try to achieve justice and reconcil-
iation.21 More recently, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
has proposed that a transitional justice approach be adopted in dealing with
the legacy of the past.22
The current fragility of the Northern Ireland peace process offers an
opportunity to consider these transitional justice events from a dispute sys-
tems design (“DSD”) perspective.23 So far, in designing systems to address
disputes related to remembering the past, Northern Ireland has taken an
unstructured, eclectic approach. It has employed both rights-based and in-
14. NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORTS AND ACCOUNTS
2011–12 (2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
246547/0490.pdf.
15. Press Release, Relatives for Justice, Victims Groups Unite to Call for Truth Commission
(April 20, 1991), http://relativesforjustice.com/victims-groups-unite-to-call-for-truth-commission.
16. See generally Cheryl Lawther, Denial, Silence and the Politics of the Past: Unpicking the
Opposition to Truth Recovery in Northern Ireland, 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 157 (2013)
(discussing Unionist opposition).
17. McCaffrey, supra note 11.
18. Dealing with Northern Ireland’s Past: Towards a Transitional Justice Approach, N. IR.
HUM. RTS. COMM’N, 13 (2013), http://www.nihrc.org/uploads/publications/NIHRC_Transi-
tional_Justice_Report.pdf.
19. See, e.g., Colm Campbell & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Local Meets Global: Transitional Jus-
tice in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 871, 883 (2003).
20. See generally Christine Bell, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1095 (2002) (discussing a piecemeal approach).
21. Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design,
14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 145 (2009). The United Nations offers a framework with four
pillars of transitional justice: justice, truth, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition. Guidance
Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice (March 2010),
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf.
22. Dealing with Northern Ireland’s Past, supra note 18.
23. See generally Andrea Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute System Design and Transi-
tional Justice, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 289 (2009); see generally CATHY A. COSTANTINO &
CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CRE-
ATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996); Lisa Blomgren Amsler, Janet K. Mar-
tinez & Stephanie E. Smith, Christina Merchant and the State of Dispute System Design, 33
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. S7 (Winter 2015).
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terest-based models,24 with a mix of processes ranging from commissions,
fact-finding bodies, independent review panels, and public inquiries to pub-
lic dialogues and prosecutions. But still, no official truth recovery system is
in place, and there is no official reconciliation mechanism. Instead, there is
peace without reconciliation.
In an address last year at Queens University in Belfast, Northern Ire-
land’s first Police Ombudsperson, Nuala O’Loan, bemoaned the fact that
although other countries emerging from violent conflict have been able to
find solutions to dealing with the past, Northern Ireland has not. Why, she
asked, “is dealing with the past such a difficult issue for Northern Ire-
land?”25 Reflecting on that question, I will argue in this Article that the
ongoing, unstructured model for dealing with the legacy of the past has not
worked in Northern Ireland, where distrust among divided communities is
common. Instead of the current eclectic approach, I propose a more com-
prehensive, structured regime using DSD principles. These principles pro-
vide the opportunity for an independent, participatory framework that can
help to build trust and then to guide and facilitate a sustainable truth recov-
ery and reconciliation process.
Following the Introduction, this Article proceeds in two parts. Part I
discusses the Agreement’s attempt to plant the seeds of peace, political sta-
bility, and reconciliation. It describes multiple efforts for dealing with the
legacy of the past since the passage of the Agreement, demonstrating an
eclectic approach with several different truth recovery projects and efforts
at reconciliation. Finally, it notes the absence of a truth commission and
suggests that possible reasons for this omission are lack of trust and cooper-
ation between all stakeholders. Part II considers how DSD principles could
be implemented within the context of a transitional justice regime such as
Northern Ireland. Using the lens of the Historical Enquiries Team, one of
the many structures put in place to deal with the legacy of the past, it dem-
onstrates how adherence to DSD principles could have made a positive dif-
ference in that failed truth recovery effort. Finally, it discusses the
challenges of implementing DSD principles in dealing with the legacy of
the past—the difficulty of reaching a consensus on identifying goals, the
inadequacy of available resources, and most critical, the lack of trust among
and between all the stakeholders.
I. EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE LEGACY OF THE PAST: AN
UNSTRUCTURED APPROACH WITH WEAK RESULTS
This Part describes the many different attempts to deal with the legacy
of the past in Northern Ireland since the passage of the Agreement. These
efforts include regimes for truth recovery as well as proposals to promote
24. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 20, at 1106.
25. O’Loan, supra note 8, at 3.
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reconciliation through public apologies, cross-border dialogue, and specific
agreements. Next, it discusses the absence of a truth commission caused in
part by distrust and lack of cooperation of all stakeholders.
A. Good Friday Agreement: Planting the Seeds of Peace, Political
Stability, and Reconciliation
The Good Friday/Belfast Agreement,26 reached in 1998, ended a pe-
riod of political violence in Northern Ireland referred to as “the Troubles.”27
During this time, over 3,600 people were killed,28 at least 40,000 were in-
jured, and an unknown number simply vanished. The latter group remains
today among the population referred to as the “Disappeared.”29 The purpose
of the Agreement was to create a consensual framework for the future gov-
ernance of a deeply divided, sectarian state.30 Every aspect of the Agree-
ment required the consent of both communities.31
The Agreement did not guarantee the long-term durability of peace, a
politically stable state, or reconciliation between divided societies. Instead,
it made these goals possible,32 providing for a new internal governance
structure of Northern Ireland, a North/South Ministerial Council, and plans
for a British-Irish Agreement to promote bilateral cooperation between the
British and Irish governments. With respect to constitutional issues, it rec-
ognized that the people of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
must both agree to a United Ireland by majority consent before it could take
place. There were provisions for human rights, decommissioning of weap-
ons, security, release of prisoners, and an independent commission to rec-
ommend future policing structures.33 Unlike peace agreements resulting
26. This represented an agreement among eight Northern Ireland political parties and an
agreement by the British and Irish governments. See The Belfast Agreement (Apr. 10, 1998),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement
.pdf.
27. The Troubles date from about 1968. See id.; see also TIM PAT COOGAN, THE TROUBLES:
IRELAND’S ORDEAL AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE (2002).
28. See DAVID MCKITTRICK, SEAMUS KELTERS, BRIAN FEENEY & CHRIS THORNTON, LOST
LIVES 1481 (1999).
29. This term refers to those individuals who were murdered and disappeared by the IRA
between 1972 and 1981. MCEVOY, supra note 9, at 61; see also Ian Cobain, Disappeared but not
Forgotten: the Grim Secrets the IRA Could Not Bury, THE GUARDIAN (May 10, 2014), http://www
.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/10/disappeared-ira-troubles-northern-ireland; Patrick Rad-
den Keefe, Where the Bodies are Buried, NEW YORKER (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.newyorker
.com/magazine/2015/03/16/where-the-bodies-are-buried.
30. John Bruton, Why Decommissioning is a Real Issue, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1200
(1999).
31. Id.
32. George J. Mitchell, Toward Peace in Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1136,
1139 (1999).
33. The St. Andrews Agreement, signed in 2006, completed some of the unfinished business
of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement and implemented it. This agreement was between the Brit-
ish and Irish governments and the political parties in Northern Ireland, including the Democratic
Unionist Party, which had opposed the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. It restored the Northern
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from violent conflicts in other countries, there was no provision for dealing
with transitional justice issues related to the past.34 Noticeably absent in the
Agreement was any design for recovering the truth about what happened
during the Troubles, nor was there any plan for promoting reconciliation in
what remained a divided society.
B. Dealing with the Past: an Eclectic Approach with Multiple Models
1. Truth Recovery Efforts: an Amalgam of Structural
Mechanisms—Commissions, Public Inquiries, and
Investigations
There has been no shortage of truth recovery efforts in Northern Ire-
land. At the same time, however, there has been no comprehensive ap-
proach to managing the challenges presented by these efforts. Multiple
mechanisms have been put in place to determine the truth of what happened
during the Troubles and to begin a healing process that could foster recon-
ciliation.35 In the absence of any clear mandate from the Agreement, North-
ern Ireland adopted an eclectic approach and engaged in assorted truth
recovery efforts. Both public and private initiatives have been involved in
this project.36 A commission was formed to deal with the Disappeared.37
Public inquiries were conducted to investigate major tragedies, such as the
Bloody Sunday massacre in Derry38 and the killing of solicitor Patrick
Finucane.39 The Police Service of Northern Ireland (“PSNI”) established
two systems: (1) the Office of Police Ombudsman to investigate allegations
of police wrongdoing40 and (2) the Historical Enquiries Team to re-examine
unsolved murders committed during the Troubles. Finally, non-governmen-
tal organizations (“NGOs”) became actively involved in accounting for vic-
Ireland Assembly and created a Northern Ireland Executive. NORTHERN IRELAND (ST. ANDREW’S
AGREEMENT) ACT 2006, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/nistandrewsact221106.pdf.
34. Bell, supra note 20, at 1096.
35. See MCEVOY, supra note 9, at 41–66 (discussing a number of truth-recovery initiatives).
36. See generally MCEVOY, supra note 9 (offering overview of unofficial truth-recovery
initiatives).
37. See id.
38. On January 30, 1972, British security forces killed thirteen people at a civil rights demon-
stration in Derry. See RICHARD NORTON-TAYLOR, BLOODY SUNDAY: SCENES FROM THE SAVILLE
INQUIRY (2005).
39. On February 12, 1989, two masked gunmen entered the home of 38-year-old Belfast
solicitor, Patrick Finucane, and murdered him in front of his wife and three children. Sir John
Stevens, Stevens Inquiry: Overview and Recommendations, CAIN WEB SERVICE (Apr. 17, 2003),
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/docs/stevens3/stevens3summary.pdf (claims of collusion be-
tween the RUC and Loyalists paramilitaries). See generally Molly R. Murphy, Northern Ireland
Policing Reform and the Intimidation of Defense Lawyers, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877 (2000).
40. POLICE OMBUDSMAN FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, https://www.policeombudsman.org.
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tims’ lives, searching for ways of healing,41 and fostering dialogue between
ex-prisoners.42
Transitional justice scholar Professor Christine Bell assesses these
early initiatives dealing with the legacy of the past and labels them as
“piecemeal.”43 Nevertheless, she acknowledges that this may have been the
most appropriate approach given the context and culture of the conflict.44
According to Bell, a deficiency of the piecemeal approach in Northern Ire-
land is the failure to move towards an accepted social narrative of the con-
flict’s causes and consequences.45
2. Reports: Recommendations, Options, and Proposals for Dealing
with the Past
In addition to the structural mechanisms put in place to deal with the
legacy of the past, there has been a voluminous output of written documents
from both the private and public sector. The following reports offer a range
of recommendations and proposals for both truth recovery and reconcilia-
tion processes.
a. Healing Through Remembering (2002):46
This report is a product of the Healing Through Remembering Project
(“Project”) that began in December 2000. Working with multiple stakehold-
ers, organizations, politicians, and individuals, the Project attempts to en-
gage with the difficult issues of the past related to truth-telling and healing.
The report emphasized the importance of sustaining processes for remem-
bering, reflecting, informing, and educating. Toward this end, it offered six
recommendations for dealing with the legacy of the past: a collective story-
telling and archiving process, a day of reflection, a permanent living memo-
rial museum, acknowledgement and truth recovery, a Healing Though
Remembering initiative, and a network of commemoration and remember-
ing projects.47
41. In 2008, the Commission for Victims and Survivors (“CVS”) was created with the goal
of advancing peace, reconciliation and justice. The CVS was oriented towards victim-based heal-
ing urged that structures be set up to deal with the past that went beyond the HET and the Police
Ombudsman. It urged that truth examination and a commitment to deal with the past be at the
forefront of government activity. COMMISSION FOR VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS, http://www.cvsni
.org/index.php/about-us.
42. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED SO-
CIETIES 67 (1997).
43. Bell, supra note 20, at 1097.
44. Id. at 1098.
45. Id. at 1144.
46. HEALING THROUGH REMEMBERING, http://www.healingthroughremembering.org/about_
us/history.
47. Id.
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b. Making Peace with the Past: Options for truth recovery
regarding the conflict in and about Northern Ireland
(2006):48
This comprehensive report is also associated with the Healing Through
Remembering Project, specifically the Sub Group on Truth Recovery and
Acknowledgement.49 Written by Queens University professor Kieran Mc-
Evoy, the report notes that there has been a “disproportional media focus on
the option of a truth commission and in particular, on the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.”50 As an alternative, it proposed five
options for dealing with the past: (1) draw a line under the past, an option
which has been described as the “do nothing else” approach and continue
with the patchwork of processes that already existed, (2) conduct internal
organizational investigations, (3) undergo community-based “bottom-up”
truth recovery efforts, (4) form a truth recovery commission, or (5) form a
commission of historical clarification that would provide a definitive, offi-
cial historical account of the conflict.
c. Consultative Group on the Past (2009):
A report issued by the Consultative Group on the Past, established by
former U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, recommended that a Legacy
(Truth) Commission be established for Northern Ireland that would address
the need for reconciliation, truth recovery, and justice. It designed a frame-
work for a truth commission that has been criticized for its lack of trans-
parency and for focusing on the language of forgetting. The independence
of the group has also been questioned by some because it was the Secretary
of State who made all the appointments to the group.51
d. Haass-O’Sullivan Negotiations Proposal:52
In 2013, the Panel of Parties in the Northern Ireland Executive was
established to address disputes that had not been resolved by the peace pro-
cess including the issue of how to deal with the legacy of the past. The
panel brought together representatives from Northern Ireland’s major politi-
cal parties and was co-chaired by former American diplomat Richard N.
Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations. The panel held con-
sultations with several hundred individuals representing civil society groups
48. MCEVOY, supra note 9.
49. Members of this diverse group included “people from loyalist, republican, British Army,
and police backgrounds, as well as individuals from different faith backgrounds, victims groups
[sic], academics, and community activists.” Id. at vii.
50. Id. at ii.
51. Aoife Duffy, A Truth Commission for Northern Ireland, 4 INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL
JUST. 26, 27 (2010).
52. HAASS-O’SULLIVAN NEGOTIATIONS PROPOSAL (2013), http://www.northernireland.gov
.uk/haass.pdf.
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across Northern Ireland. The final draft proposal called for a (1) new organ-
ization that would deal with the legacy of the past53 and (2) full acknowl-
edgement of responsibility to further the goal of reconciliation.54 However,
it failed to gain acceptance by all political parties,55 some of whom were
concerned about unresolved issues related to flags and parades.56
3. Absence of a Truth Commission: Lack of Trust and Cooperation
by All Stakeholders
Missing from the array of efforts to deal with the legacy of the past is a
formal truth recovery mechanism, such as a truth commission. This is a
well-known, yet contestable, method of dealing with the past that has been
employed by several other countries during transitional justice regimes.57
The absence of a truth commission is not due to a lack of knowledge. As
Northern Ireland began its search for ways to deal with the legacy of hurt
and hatred from the past, it consulted with representatives from South Af-
rica. The Deputy Chairman of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission visited Northern Ireland and issued an extensive report, outlin-
ing the similarities and differences between South Africa and Northern Ire-
land.58 One significant difference between the two countries—which,
according to the report, could not be overemphasized—was the difference
between the nature and role of the state in South Africa and Northern Ire-
land.59 A new state had emerged in South Africa while Northern Ireland
would have the same state that would have to be engaged in any truth re-
covery process.60
Why is there no truth commission for Northern Ireland?61 One reason
for the absence of a truth commission may be the almost universal distrust
53. The new institution, the Historical Investigations Unit, would be empowered to conduct
Article 2-compliant reviews and investigations and, where appropriate, refer cases to the Public
Prosecution Service. Id. at 25–26.
54. The report noted that, “[t]o advance reconciliation and healing at both the individual and
societal levels, acknowledgements should be more than apologies.” Id. at 23.
55. Kristin Archick, Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., at 11
(2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21333.pdf.
56. Richard Haass talks: Final proposal document published, BBC (Dec. 31, 2013), http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-25560886.
57. See, e.g., BURYING THE PAST: MAKING PEACE AND DOING JUSTICE AFTER CIVIL CON-
FLICT (Nigel Biggar ed., 2003); Audrey R. Chapman & Patrick Ball, The Truth of Truth Commis-
sions: Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (2001).
58. All Truth is Bitter: A Report of the Visit of Doctor Alex Boraine, Deputy Chairman of the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Northern Ireland, CAIN WEB SERVICE
(1999), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/victims/docs/alltruthisbitter99.pdf.
59. Id. at 21.
60. See supra text accompanying note 49.
61. See Brandon Hamber, Conclusion: A Truth Commission for Northern Ireland?, http://
www.brandonhamber.com/publications/Chap%207%20%20SA%20&%20NI%20Brandon%20
Hamber.pdf; Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, Attitudes Towards a Truth Commission for
Northern Ireland in Relation to Party Political Affiliation, 22 IRISH POL. STUD. 321 (2007).
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of any groups who had been involved in the conflict to direct a truth recov-
ery process.62 Thus, the authors of Making Peace with the Past state that
“any truth recovery mechanism or process must be, and be accepted as,
independent of the state, combatant groups, political parties, civil society,
and economic interests.”63 A second reason for the lack of a truth commis-
sion may be a perception by some parties that not all stakeholders are coop-
erating and participating in the effort to recover the truth about the
Troubles. This has led to reluctance to participate by potentially cooperative
stakeholders. The comments of one Republican party representative reflect
the ongoing doubts and suspicions that impede truth recovery:
It is quite evident there will be no republicans going forward into
a process where from the very beginning it is accepted that the
British government isn’t going to present their piece of the mo-
saic. The truth is . . . all of the truth – it can’t be some of it.64
4. Reconciliation Efforts: Public Apologies, Cross-Border
Dialogue, and Negotiated Agreements
Just as the Agreement failed to deal with the challenge of truth recov-
ery, follow-up agreements also failed to deal with the need to promote rec-
onciliation in the divided society of Northern Ireland.65 In recent years,
however, there has been a more concerted effort to promote reconciliation
through public apologies,66 cross-border dialogue, and negotiated agree-
ments. The most recent efforts are described in the following sections.67
62. Lundy & McGovern, supra note 61, at 331.
63. MCEVOY, supra note 9, at vii.
64. McCaffery, supra note 11.
65. Ryan Gawn, Still Shackled by the Past: Truth and Recovery in Northern Ireland, THE
PEACE AND CONFLICT REV., http://www.review.upeace.org/index.cfm?opcion=0&ejemplar=13&
entrada=72 (discussing a follow-up program called the “Programme for Government”).
66. Dealing with Northern Ireland’s Past, supra note 18, at 9 (describing the UK govern-
ment’s public apology for the killings that occurred in Derry/Londonderry in January 1972 and
Prime Minister David Cameron’s apology to the Finucane family in 2011 and again in 2012 for
the state collusion in the murder of Pat Finucane).
67. “We in this island are involved in a new kind of symbolic migration – from peace to true
reconciliation. In the peace process, we have been engaged in one of the most ambitious and far-
reaching political projects of our time.” President Michael Higgins, British Council Annual Lec-
ture at Queens University Belfast (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.president.ie/en/media-library/
speeches/president-delivers-the-2012-british-council-annual-lecture-queens-universit).
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a. Proposed Agreement among the Parties of the Northern
Ireland Executive on Parades, Select
Commemorations, and Related Protests: Flags
and Emblems and Contending with the Past
(2013)68
This proposed agreement, also referred to as the Haass-O’Sullivan Ne-
gotiations,69 addressed contentious issues related to flags and parades and
urged all parties involved with such disputes to engage in “sustained and
meaningful dialogue as a matter of priority and with due regard for the
rights and responsibilities of all sides.”70 It also focused on the goal of ad-
vancing reconciliation and healing, noting that the burden of the past rests
on those who acted outside the rule of law. The proposed agreement en-
couraged public acknowledgement of violent actions that should go beyond
apologies. It noted that saying sorry is not enough, and it encouraged indi-
viduals, groups, and governments to collaborate on statements of acknowl-
edgement that included acceptance of responsibility and sincere expressions
of remorse for having caused pain and injury.71
b. Stormont House Agreement (2014)72
This agreement between the British and Irish governments and major-
ity of political parties that constitute the Northern Ireland Executive re-
sponded to the ongoing conflicts that continued after the Good Friday
Agreement. It provided for dealing with the past and contentious issues re-
lated to flags and parades by proposing that a Commission on Flags, Iden-
tity, Culture and Tradition be established. Reconciliation was a key
provision. The agreement established a framework for a reconciliation pro-
cess, providing that a group be established to oversee archives and informa-
tion recovery and promoting reconciliation as a key goal. Guiding
principles to which the participants agreed are: promoting reconciliation;
upholding the rule of law; acknowledging the suffering of victims and sur-
vivors; facilitating the pursuit of justice and information recovery; compli-
ance with human rights; and balance, transparency, fairness and equity.73
c. Glencree Dialogue (2015)
In June 2015, I had the privilege of participating in a cross-border dia-
logue at the Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation that focused on
68. See HAASS-O’SULLIVAN NEGOTIATIONS PROPOSAL, supra note 52.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 52–56.
70. HAASS-O’SULLIVAN NEGOTIATIONS PROPOSAL, supra note 52, at 8.
71. Id.
72. See Hazel Armstrong & Paul Bowers, Northern Ireland: Stormont House Agreement
update, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBR. (Aug. 18, 2015), http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/
ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7284.
73. Id. at 8–9.
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the theme “1916 and the Ethics of Memory.”74 Participants gathered to con-
sider the challenge of how to reflect on the legacy of the 1916 uprising in
Ireland.75 Listening to the thoughtful voices of participants, who included
former paramilitaries as well as government officials, it became apparent to
me that the legacy of the recent Troubles was driving much of the discus-
sion. In a powerful address, the President of Ireland, Michael Higgins,
while emphasizing the critical importance of reconciliation as part of deal-
ing with the past, was quite explicit in maintaining that truth recovery was a
condition precedent to reconciliation:
As we contemplate what must happen to enable us to deal with
the past in Northern Ireland, there are difficult conversations to be
had, difficult acknowledgements to be made about wrongdoing by
state and non-state actors, reparations to be made for injuries suf-
fered, and ultimately acceptance of the realities about which peo-
ple still hesitate to speak but which are manifest in cases like
Bloody Sunday, in the recovery of the bodies of the Disappeared,
stolen from their families, savagely murdered and secretly buried.
It must happen if we are to be reconciled as a people.76
II. DISPUTE SYSTEMS DESIGN IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A PARTICIPATORY
FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE AND FACILITATE TRUTH RECOVERY
AND RECONCILIATION
DSD principles offer a comprehensive and structured approach for cre-
ating a regime to deal with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland. In
developing a roadmap for a truth recovery and reconciliation system, the
questions are straightforward: What are the goals sought to be achieved?
Who are the stakeholders, and what are their goals and interests?77 What
structures are available? What resources are available? What accountability
is provided? Who has control over the design of the system?78 Important
values of transparency, procedural fairness, legitimacy, and trust are impli-
cated in these questions.
In applying DSD principles within the context of a transitional justice
regime, Professors Stephanie Smith and Janet Martinez identify some key
74. Higgins, supra note 8.
75. The uprising, also referred to as the Easter Rising or Easter Rebellion, occurred in April
1916 in Dublin. Fifteen Irishmen were executed at the Kilmainham jail in Dublin by the British
military. See PETER DE ROSA, REBELS: THE IRISH RISING OF 1916 (Doubleday, 1991); TIM PAT
COOGAN, MICHAEL COLLINS: THE MAN WHO MADE IRELAND (Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1996)
(1992).
76. Higgins, supra note 8.
77. NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DIS-
PUTES 69–84 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2013).
78. Lisa B. Bingham, Mandatory Arbitration: Control Over Dispute-System Design and
Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2004). See generally Lisa B.
Bingham et al., Participatory Governance in South Korea: Legal Infrastructure, Economic Devel-
opment, and Dispute Resolution, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 375 (2007).
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questions confronting policymakers. A critical issue is whether the system
designers seek justice, reconciliation, or a combination of the two. Will de-
signers create one process or multiple processes to pursue these goals?
Smith and Martinez warn that failure to include relevant stakeholders can
result in a lack of justice and fairness and be a recipe for disaster.79
Part of the contemporary conflict in Northern Ireland over how to re-
member the legacy of the past is based on differing views of how DSD
principles should be implemented. The longstanding debate over what
structures should be in place to recover truth and achieve reconciliation is
illustrative of this conflict. Working from the assumption that justice re-
quires truth and that reconciliation promotes healing,80 groups with differ-
ent interests have lined up along the sectarian divide. One political party has
argued that the reconciliation process could progress if it were separated
from the search for truth about what happened during the Troubles. Accord-
ing to a representative of the Sinn Fein party, “As long as they remain a
binary process, then one can’t go forward without the other.”81 On the other
hand, a well-known victims group claims that reconciliation in the absence
of truth amounts to impunity: “[I]t is like putting a roof on the house, before
building the walls.”82 Moreover, Professor Christine Bell challenges the as-
sumption that reconciliation promotes healing: “Expecting victims to give
up retributive desires in favour [sic] of reconciling narratives may not con-
tribute to their ‘healing’ at all.”83 The debate continues to polarize the di-
vided communities.
The following section examines a failed effort by the police service to
deal with the legacy of the past and discusses how attention to the inclusion
principles of DSD could have made a positive difference in the outcome.
The Historical Enquiries Team (“HET”) was set up by the police service in
Northern Ireland to re-examine unsolved murders committed during the
Troubles and to respond to families’ needs for information. The failure to
include the families of victims in the design of the process and the lack of
transparency and accountability ultimately resulted in a lack of trust and the
ultimate demise of the process. Finally, this section discusses the challenges
affecting the implementation of DSD principles in designing structures to
deal with the legacy of the past. Lack of consensus on what goals are neces-
sary or desirable, insufficient resources to support these goals, and weak
levels of trust among stakeholders have impeded successful implementation
of DSD principles.
79. Smith & Martinez, supra note 21, at 162.
80. DAVID BLOOMFIELD ET AL., RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: A HANDBOOK
19 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003).
81. McCaffery, supra note 11.
82. Id.
83. Bell, supra note 20, at 1141; see also Ellen Waldman, Restorative Justice and the Pre-
Conditions for Grace: Taking Victim’s Needs Seriously, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 91
(2007).
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A. Rise and Fall of the Historical Enquiries Team: Failed Legitimacy
One of the structures put in place to deal with the legacy of the past
was the HET, which before its demise was described as a “distinctive pro-
cess” in international policing.84 The HET was established by the British
government as part of a series of reform measures it had put in place in
order to comply with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.85 In 2001, the European Court of Human Rights found the UK gov-
ernment to be in breach of Article 2 (Right to Life) in several cases related
to the Troubles, where a critical issue was the police’s inadequate investiga-
tion of police shootings.86
The HET was ultimately set up by the PSNI in 2005 as a special police
unit to re-examine unsolved murders committed during the Troubles—spe-
cifically, conflict-related deaths that occurred between 1969 and 1998 that
did not directly involve the police as a perpetrator. Some NGOs were con-
sulted as it was set up. The HET’s purpose was to respond to families’
needs for micro-level information, to have answers to what the Secretary of
State described as “simple questions about the death of their loved ones,”87
and to bring closure to conflict-related deaths.88 It was staffed by retired
police officers from Northern Ireland and from police services across the
United Kingdom. Some NGOs actively engaged with HET by bringing
cases to it and by representing clients.89
As part of its work, the HET interviewed soldiers and, in some cases,
offered apologies to the families of the victims.90 Professor Patricia Lundy
reports that the decision to offer or decline an apology in fatal shooting
cases relied on HET investigations that were deeply flawed.91 Many fami-
lies wondered: Who received apologies, and who did not? What was the
reasoning?
In an empirical study of the HET’s operations published in 2009,
Lundy concluded that despite its efforts to demonstrate independence and
impartiality to all community groups, the result was otherwise: “at every
stage of the process, independence and integrity appear to have been com-
promised.”92 The HET was criticized for its over-reliance on police corpo-
84. Patricia Lundy, Can the Past Be Policed?: Lessons from the Historical Enquiries Team
Northern Ireland, 11 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 109, 111 (2009).
85. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
86. See, e.g., Christine Bell & Johanna Keenan, Lost on the Way Home? The Right to Life in
Northern Ireland, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 68, 75–77, 86 (2005).
87. Gawn, supra note 65.
88. Lundy, supra note 84, at 161.
89. Id. at 121.
90. Lundy & Rolston, supra note 13, at 113–14.
91. Id. at 116.
92. Lundy, supra note 84, at 126.
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rate memory, the absence of competing memories and alternative voices,93
its failure to reinvestigate cases,94 lack of information given to victims,95
and questionable transparency on several issues.96 The use of RUC officers
throughout the process contributed to perceptions of bias and conflict of
interest.97 The Report argued that in order for a truth recovery process to
gain legitimacy from the community at large, it needed to be separated from
policing.98
In July 2013, a highly critical report of the HET raised public policy
concerns about the manner in which the agency carried out its mandate. It
appeared that inequality of treatment was embedded in the system,99 as the
report found that the HET treated deaths in which there was state involve-
ment differently from cases where state actors were not involved.100 The
Northern Ireland Police Board announced its lack of confidence in the lead-
ership of the HET,101 and the PSNI announced that due to financial is-
sues,102 the HET would be discontinued and its work taken up by the
Legacy Investigative Branch of the PSNI.103 Unlike the arms-length HET,
the Legacy Investigations Branch is fully integrated into the PSNI. It is not
surprising that a number of concerns have been expressed about public con-
fidence and the independence and accountability of the most recent entity
assigned with the responsibility of conducting truth recovery
investigations.104
93. Id. at 169.
94. Id.
95. Lundy & Rolston, supra note 13, at 112.
96. Lundy, supra note 84, at 143, 153. These include the criteria applied at any stage of the
process at which a decision can be made to stop an investigation and the issues of identifying or
tracing soldiers as suspects and/or eyewitnesses.
97. Lundy, supra note 84, at 167.
98. Id. at 168. This recommendation was made in light of a Northern Ireland survey that
found “almost universal distrust” of allowing any groups that had been involved in the conflict to
be responsible for managing a truth recovery process.
99. Id. at 137.
100. HMIC, Inspections of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (last visited Apr. 1, 2016),
https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/our-work/specialist-inspections/inspections-of-the-
police-service-of-northern-ireland/.
101. BBC News, NI Policing Board Declares ‘Do Confidence’ in HET (July 4, 2013), http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-23181060.
102. Claire Cromie, PSNI Cuts 300 Jobs and Axes Historical Enquiries Team, BELFAST TELE-
GRAPH (Sep. 30, 2014), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/psni-cuts-300-
jobs-and-axes-historical-enquiries-team-30626460.html (describing budget cuts that required the
discontinuance of the HET).
103. New PSNI unit to investigate Northern Ireland’s past, BBC NEWS (Dec. 04, 2014), http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-30330751.
104. A historical investigations unit independent of the police was proposed in the Stormont
House Agreement but budget issues related to welfare reform have slowed down the process of
implementing that proposal. Colletta Smith, HMIC concern over accountability of PSNI’s Legacy
Investigations Branch, BBC NEWS (June 24, 2015), www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-
33248848.
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B. How DSD Principles Could Have Made a Difference: Preventing
Multiple Deficiencies in Procedural Justice
Recalling some basic DSD questions can help shed light on how DSD
principles could have made a difference with the HET or with developing
any system to deal with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland. Who had
control over the design of the HET? Who were the stakeholders? What were
their goals and interests?
The British government and the PSNI had control over the design of
the HET system. Yet, the stakeholders included not just the British govern-
ment, British soldiers, and police officers, but also the families of victims.
In fact, the families of victims were major stakeholders in this truth recov-
ery process. While there was some consultation with a few NGOs, there is
no evidence that the voices of victims’ families were heard or included in
any significant way during the design stage.
One of the major goals of the HET was to provide families with infor-
mation about the death of their loved ones and to answer their questions. As
part of participating in the HET process, several families requested apolo-
gies. While some families received them, others did not. No reasons were
given. This information gap raises questions about legitimacy and
transparency.
Procedural justice studies shed light on the importance of fairness in
creating a dispute resolution system105 and the inclusion of stakeholders in
the design of a process.106 These studies show that parties are likely to find
a decision-making process fair if they had the opportunity to share what
was important to them (voice),107 if they received respectful treatment from
the decision-maker,108 if they were treated in an even-handed way,109 and if
they had some level of trust in the decision-maker.110
105. E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
218 (Melvin J. Lerner ed., 1988) (1948).
106. Lisa B. Bingham, Mandatory Arbitration: Control Over Dispute-System Design and
Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 222 (2004); see also Ramji-
Nogales, Designing Bespoke Transitional Justice: A Pluralist Process Approach, 32 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1, 38 (2010) (describing how the failure of the Special Court for Sierra Leoneans to
include Sierra Leoneans in the design process led to its failure to win support from its natural
allies).
107. E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
218 (Melvin J. Lerner ed., 1988) (1948); Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to
Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 473, 488
(2010). See generally Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights
from Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDU. 49 (2004).
108. Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 122
(2000).
109. Tom R. Tyler, Does the American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psy-
chological Research on Deference to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 664 (2007).
110. Id. at 671.
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Applying the findings of procedural justice studies, it is likely that if
the families of victims thought the HET system was procedurally just, they
would have been more amenable to accepting the HET truth recovery pro-
cess, respecting it, and believing in its legitimacy. With few exceptions, if
the families had been treated respectfully, they might have had greater trust
in the process.111 But the HET was flawed by multiple deficiencies in pro-
cedural justice. It failed to include major stakeholders in the design of the
process, and it failed to satisfy their interests. There was no transparency on
the issue of who received apologies and no accountability for carrying out
the HET mandate to reinvestigate cases. Families of victims lacked confi-
dence in the HET due to perceived lack of independence of the police.
Without sufficient transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, there was a
complete shutdown of trust. In short, the HET failed to move forward the
process of truth recovery.
C. Challenges in Implementing DSD Principles: Filling the Multiple
Voids
Three major deficiencies prevent the successful implementation of
DSD principles in dealing with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland.
1. Lack of Consensus Regarding Goals
One of the challenges in implementing DSD principles in Northern
Ireland’s transitional justice regime is reaching a consensus on a strategic
approach to achieving goals. While there is general agreement about the
need to deal with the legacy of the past, there is no consensus on what
approach to take or whose narrative of events controls the thinking and
policy that goes into the design of that project. Moreover, there is no con-
sensus on whether reconciliation needs to be a part of truth recovery efforts.
Achieving consensus will require active engagement by representatives of
all stakeholders.112
2. Lack of Resources
A second DSD challenge relates to the availability of resources. Estab-
lishing a mechanism for truth recovery has costs, and these costs need to be
measured against competing fiscal concerns. This is a critical issue, as
outside funders have pulled back financial resources that once flooded
Northern Ireland after the Agreement was signed,113 and domestic budget
111. Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REV.
847, 861 (1998) (suggesting that there is a greater likelihood of compliance with the law when it is
considered to be legitimate).
112. Marianna Hernandez Crespo, From Noise to Music: The Potential of the Multi-Door
Courthouse (Casas de Justicia) Model to Advance Systemic Inclusion and Participation as a
Foundation for Sustainable Rule of Law in Latin America, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 336, 372 (2012).
113. O’Loan, supra note 8.
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problems persist.114 Should money be spent for victims who need wheel-
chairs or to monitor unruly sectarian parades?115
3. Lack of Trust
Finally, trust is a key missing element which needs to be either discov-
ered or recovered. Lack of trust has been a prominent feature of the North-
ern Ireland landscape long before the Troubles.116 It is by no means,
however, a deficiency limited to Northern Ireland. Lack of trust is consis-
tent with identity-based conflicts which are rooted in the past. It is a prob-
lem encountered in many post-conflict regimes. And this is where our field
of dispute resolution has been deficient. We have not developed adequate
responses for dealing with conflicts rooted in the past. Frequently, media-
tion is considered the default process.117 But much of traditional mediation
and other conflict-resolution thinking, at least in the United States, is not
inclined to focus very much on the past. Mediation is considered a forward-
looking process that does not try to place any blame for past harmful
events.118 This is problematic when the goal is to recover the truth about the
past. It is possible, however, that more consideration of transformative and
narrative models of mediation might be useful in helping parties engage
with the past and restore relationships.119
CONCLUSION
The truth recovery process thus far has been fragmented with no over-
arching plan or comprehensive structure.120 Official state-directed efforts
co-exist with unofficial private efforts. Funding comes and goes. Programs
114. Claire Cromie, Budget 2015: Northern Ireland Reaction, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Aug. 7,
2015), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/budget-2015-northern-ireland-re-
action-31361989.html (comments of the Sinn Fein party); Northern Ireland Economy: New Kind
of Trouble, ECONOMIST (Jan. 24, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21640334-guns-
mostly-silent-ulster-can-begin-deal-its-lamentable-economy-new-kind.
115. O’Loan, supra note 8.
116. See generally TIM PAT COOGAN, THE TROUBLES: IRELAND’S ORDEAL AND THE SEARCH
FOR PEACE (Palgrave 2002).
117. See, e.g., Seamus Dunn & Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Conflict in Northern Ireland after the
Good Friday Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1372, 1378 (1999).
118. See CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 393 (3rd ed., rev. 2003).  He notes
that:
Much of current mediation thinking, and the views of many practitioners, posit that
mediation is a forward-looking process, one that does not strive to place blame for past
negative or harmful events and one that strives to solve immediate problems so that
parties’ interests and future relationships are positively met and redefined.
See also Barbara Tint, History, Memory, and Intractable Conflict, 27 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 239,
247 (2010). But see JAY ROTHMAN, RESOLVING IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT: IN NATIONS, ORGANI-
ZATIONS, AND COMMUNITIES (Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers 1997) (discussing the importance of
looking to the past in identity-based conflict).
119. Michael Alberstein, Forms of Mediation and Law: Cultures of Dispute Resolution, 22
OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 321, 334 (2007).
120. Lundy, supra note 84, at 119.
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rise and fall.121 As several scholars have observed, the current unstructured
approach to dealing with the past is not working for Northern Ireland.122 In
the meantime, the past continues to have a destabilizing effect on the
present.
As new approaches are considered in designing a truth recovery sys-
tem with traction, all signs point toward independence as a critical value in
the design.123 Independence does not necessarily mean neutrality. It is not
even clear to what extent DSD is a neutral activity124 or whether neutrality
is possible in a country such as Northern Ireland.125 But with independence,
a sustainable truth recovery process is possible. The divided communities in
Northern Ireland can begin to build trust—the missing link in earlier efforts
to recover truth. Within an atmosphere of trust, DSD principles have breath-
ing space and are able to offer a participatory framework for guiding the
development of a sustainable truth recovery model. Without trust, no
amount of creative process design will achieve that goal.
In imagining how DSD principles can help to build trust, there are
more questions than answers. Given so many past attempts at truth recov-
ery, it takes a certain degree of courage and hope to believe that a process
can be designed with transparency, legitimacy, and a framework for recon-
ciliation. Identifying and then including representatives of all stakeholders
in the design of an independent truth recovery process is a good place to
begin.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 77–103 (discussion of the HET).
122. See Written Submission from Kieran McEvoy et al., to Dr. Richard Haass, Dr. Meghan
O’Sullivan and the Panel of Parties, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland: Amnesties, Prose-
cutions and the Public Interest (March 2015), http://amnesties-prosecution-public-interest.co.uk/
themainevent/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Amnesties-Prosecutions-and-Public-Interest-Submis-
sion-to-Haass-7-Oct1.pdf.
123. See, e.g., All Truth is Bitter, supra note 58, at 21: “It is clear that any new process of truth
telling must be accepted as legitimate by all Northern Ireland traditions, must be seen to be inde-
pendent and must have sufficient authority to conduct its proceedings in a way which reinforces
it’s [sic] independence.”
124. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design?
And What We Should (Not) Do About It: Lessons from International and Domestic Fronts, 14
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195 (2009) (asking whether DSD is a neutral activity).
125. In 1996, I had the privilege of conducting mediation training in Northern Ireland with my
colleague and former Dean, Professor John Feerick. When we stressed the importance of neutral-
ity, one participant stated: “A car in neutral isn’t going anywhere. No one in Northern Ireland is
neutral.” See Dunn & Nolan-Haley, supra note 117, at 1385.
